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No Wilder No. You’ve got to listen to me.  People like fear.  We all 
want to be frightened and we all want somebody to tell us how to live 
and who to fuck and why we should do this and think that.  And that’s 
the Devil’s job.  That’s why I’m important to them, Wilder, because if 
you can make up a terrorist you’ve given people the Devil.  They love 
the Devil.  They need the Devil.  That’s my job. You get me?
  —RICHARD FLANAGAN, THE UNKNOWN TERRORIST
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper I will argue that sex offenders in the United States are scapegoats, 
and for that reason are subjected to social violence far in excess of the dangers they 
pose.  The media and the law frame certain sexually deviant behavior as monstrous, 
and those who engage in such behavior as monsters.  Putative experts on deviance—
psychologists and psychiatrists—generally do not directly refer to sex offenders as 
monsters, but instead create categorizations of mental disorders which perform a 
similar function: they brand sex offenders as persons who are unable to control their 
impulses.  The result of such frameworks is the creation of a class of persons who are 
not simply unsympathetic, but are regarded as undeserving of certain legal and moral 
rights.
The metaphor of the monster is telling: a monster triggers fear and loathing be-
cause it is a creature with certain human characteristics.  Humans branded as 
monsters are convenient scapegoats that society can blame for social disorder. 
Individuals who have committed sex offenses are framed as monsters and considered 
not entirely human.  Society can then justify depriving them of liberty beyond the 
constitutional constraints of the criminal code on the ground that incarceration is 
necessary to protect the public.1  Convicted sex offenders, after they serve their crim-
inal terms, may be civilly committed for life under so-called sexually violent predator 
(or person) acts, or at a minimum subjected to community supervision for life under 
a state’s Megan’s Law.2
Modern psychiatric diagnoses, and the experts who make them, play crucial 
roles in both criminal and civil commitment proceedings.  These diagnoses incorpo-
rate the framework of sexual offender as monster, in part, because psychiatry carries 
remnants of theology.3  The early-modern, theology-infused monster has become, in 
this disenchanted age, the psychopath, the person with an anti-social personality 
1. As I argue in section II, such crimes include sex offenses, especially against children, certain drug 
offenses, especially where children are victimized, and murders aggravated by virtue of being especially 
heinous.
2. See discussion infra pp. 41–48.
3. In a recent interview, psychiatrist Thomas Szasz pointed out:
  Three hundred years ago, every human predicament was seen as a religious problem—
sickness, poverty, suicide, war. Now they are all seen as medical problems—as psychiatric 
problems, as caused by genes and curable with ‘therapy.’  In the past, the criminal law was 
imbued with theology; now, it’s imbued with psychiatry. 
 Randall C. Wyatt, An Interview with Thomas Szasz, M.D.: Liberty & the Practice of Psychotherapy,  
Psychotherapy.net, Dec. 2000, http://www.psychotherapy.net/interview/Thomas_Szasz.
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disorder, and the sex offender.4  The media’s and lawmakers’ framing of sex offenders 
as monsters, and the incorporation of the monster framework into legal proceedings 
through the use of psychiatric testimony and diagnoses, results in a nearly invisible, 
unjust deprivation of liberty.
In section II of this paper, I will provide a brief analysis of what I mean by 
framing, and apply that analysis to the role of the monster in modern culture.  I show 
that when we pay attention to the ways sex offenders are reframed as monsters, their 
social role as scapegoats becomes apparent.  In section III, I argue that the retribu-
tive response to sex offenses is far more severe than the risks sex offenders pose to 
society.  I argue, further, that this extreme response is best understood as a reaction 
not simply to the risks posed by sex offenders, but to our fear of acknowledging that 
acts we criminalize and condemn as monstrous sex offenses are nonetheless acts of 
persons with very human, if often deviant, desires.  I conclude by suggesting that the 
same strategies that are used to control sex offenders may be deployed to control 
other classes of violent offenders with similar consequences for justice.
II. FRAMING, REFRAMING, AND THE CREATION OF MONSTERS
Sex offenders are, of course, persons.  However, they have been framed as mon-
sters by media, politicians, and academics.  In this section, I examine the nature and 
functions of framing, and apply that analysis to the concept of the monster.  Against 
this background, I argue that legal strategies for depriving sex offenders of their lib-
erty are unjust, albeit nearly invisible.
A. Frames and the Organization of Experience
Social psychologists, cognitive linguists, and cognitive scientists have developed 
overlapping theories of a powerful cognitive mechanism for organizing experience, 
variously called frames, schemas, scripts, and idealized cognitive models.5  Sociologist, 
Erving Goffman, uses the term frame to refer to principles of organization, which 
“govern events—at least social ones—and our subjective involvement in them.”6 
These principles of organization, or cognitive patterns, organize the experience such 
that an experience means something very specific relative to the frame, model, cate-
gory, schema, or pattern.  Anthropologist, Gregory Bateson, analyzes play in terms 
of frames and models; a bit of serious activity may be used as a model to construct 
unserious versions of the same activity: chess is play based on the model of medieval 
warfare.7  An action may be called a bite if framed by an animal fighting, or a “playful 
4. Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 155 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & 
trans., Routledge 1991) (1946) (“The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and 
intellectualization and, above all, by the ‘disenchantment of the world.’”).
5. See generally George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal 
About the Mind 5–115 (1987) [hereinafter Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things].
6. Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience 10 (1974).
7. Id. at 7.
34
SEX OFFENDER AS SCAPEGOAT
nip” if we are talking about an animal at play.8  Cognitive scientists and linguists 
have shown the extent to which models, frames, and patterns are responsible for the 
variations in the ways people experience an event that, from a God’s-eye point of 
view—an impartial or objective “view from nowhere”—might seem nearly identi-
cal.9  
This notion of framing has been applied to morality.  I may frame an act as an 
act of robbery, and you may frame the same act as a necessary stage in feeding your 
children.  The legend of Robin Hood, a hero who steals from the rich and gives to 
the poor, suggests that reframing robbery as a courageous act of compassion is an 
example of moral framing.  A foe of abortion will frame her opponents as 
pro-abortion; an opponent of legal prohibitions on abortion will frame her opponents 
as anti-choice.  In both cases, a frame organizes experience.10
Metaphors play fundamental, indeed foundational, roles in constructing frames 
and hence deeply influence a person’s understanding of the world.11  Reframing al-
ways involves changing metaphors.12  Often one frame takes an activity to be a 
natural activity, part of the natural world, a literal model; while another frame takes 
the activity to be a metaphor.  War to a soldier on the front lines is serious, non-
metaphorical business; war as a frame for the game of chess or animal play is a 
metaphor.  More to the point here, many victims of sex offenses endure very serious, 
literal invasions of their sense of self.  Rape and child abuse in particular are deeply 
immoral acts precisely because they exemplify, are even models for, denying the vic-
tims’ dignity.
However, the perpetrators of sex offenses are persons who have made immoral 
choices.  In the media and legal discourse, they are reframed as monsters and viewed 
as incapable of making choices, or exercising autonomy.13  Within the monster frame, 
sex offenders are viewed as driven by non-human, animal impulses over which they 
8. Gregory Bateson, A Theory of Play and Fantasy, in APA Research Reports II, 1955, reprinted in 
Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 177–93 (5th ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) 
(1972).
9. Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, supra note 5, at 68–69.  On the notice of impartiality 
as a “view from nowhere” or a God’s-eye point of view, see Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere 
76–77 (1986), arguing that to have experience is to have a point of view.  If experience is always a point 
of view, then it is always organized in terms of some frame or other.
10. See George Lakoff, Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think 372–73 (2d ed. 
Univ. of Chicago Press 2002) [hereinafter Lakoff, Moral Politics] (arguing that political thinking is 
a cognitive activity shot through with framing, reframing, and categories that refer to prohibitions, 
permissions, and other moral judgments).
11. See Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, supra note 5, at 5–7.
12. See id. at 338–52 (illustrating that the mind was once metaphorically considered a “ghost in the machine” 
but is now regarded as a type of machine); Lakoff, Moral Politics, supra note 10, at 418–26 (arguing 
that the Democratic Party must reframe metaphors used in public discourse to modify public perceptions 
of their politics).
13. Elizabeth Garfinkle, Comment, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplication of Sex-Offender Registration 
and Community-Notification Laws to Juveniles, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 163, 168–75 (2003). 
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have little or no control.  Our standards of legal justice do not apply to persons re-
framed as monsters.
B. The Monstrous Other: A Long Tradition
The term “monster,” like its semantic cousin “predator,” is a common metaphor 
for persons who commit horrifying, unnatural acts.  However, a historical perspec-
tive can help us to recognize the less visible ways the words are incorporated into 
legal and psychiatric languages, such as the distinction between the normal and the 
abnormal.  In this section, I begin my examination of the monster metaphor, with 
the twin aims of uncovering the sources of the social hysteria over sex offending and 
restoring humanity to the offender.  It is necessary to look at this from a historical 
perspective, for if we only examine the response to malevolent sexual conduct from 
the vantage point of the present, features of that response may be hidden from view. 
As I have demonstrated in my previous work, throughout the Renaissance and 
the Enlightenment a powerful figure of popular, literary, scientific, and legal cul-
tures was the animal in human form: the prodigy, a species of monster.14  Monsters, 
we learn from the history of the concept, may serve as sacrificial surrogates to purify 
sexual conduct of dangerous forms, because monsters symbolize our moral infirmi-
ties.15  The language we use today to describe sex offenders retains the historical 
association of half-human monsters with deviant sexuality.  Sexual offenders are re-
ferred to as predators in the law, as well as the media, suggesting that a sex offender 
is not a member of civilized society.16  
We can trace the concept of the monster to St. Thomas Aquinas’s distinction 
between an unnatural sexual act and a sexual act that resulted from a moral choice to 
engage in sexual conduct that was abhorrent to the natural order created by God.17 
Aquinas used the term prodigy to demarcate the most abhorrent form of monster 
produced by bestiality and sodomy, traditionally the two most abominable sexual 
acts.  The prodigy represented acts to which the only appropriate response was hor-
ror.18  During the Renaissance, the prodigy was regarded with awe.  In a sense, it was 
an example of the sublime.  As sixteenth century chronicler of monstrosities, 
Ambroise Paré, put it:
14. See, e.g., John Douard, Loathing the Sinner, Medicalizing the Sin: Why Sexually Violent Predator Statutes 
Are Unjust, 30 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 36, 40–42 (2007); see also Lorraine Daston & Katharine 
Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature 173–214 (1998); Arnold I. Davidson, The Emergence 
of Sexuality 93–124 (2001).
15. A.W. Bates, Emblematic Monsters: Unnatural Conceptions and Deformed Births in Early 
Modern Europe 43–57 (2005). 
16. The first definition of predator in the Oxford English Dictionary is an animal that survives by eating its 
prey alive.  22 The Oxford English Dictionary 328 (2d ed. 1989).
17. Davidson, supra note 14, at 99–100 (discussing the early history of the connection between monsters 
and sexuality in Aquinas’s analysis of the effects of the “lustful vices”). 
18. Douard, supra note 14, at 40.
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There are monsters that are born with a form that is half-animal and half-
human . . . which are produced by sodomists and atheists who join together, 
and break out of their bounds contrary to nature, with animals, and from this 
are born several monsters that are hideous and very scandalous to look at or 
speak about . . . . [I]t is . . . a great horror for a man or a woman to mix with 
or copulate with brute animals; and as a result, some are born half-men and 
half-animals.19
The social function of the concept of the monster, revealed by its history, is that 
the monster establishes and reinforces norms of conduct, while appearing to be a 
description of the progeny produced by copulation outside the natural order.  The 
monster is abnormal both in a statistical sense and in a normative sense.  Symbolically, 
the monster reflects the conviction that some conduct, especially deviant sexual con-
duct, is not only statistically abnormal, but also evil.  Indeed, the very derivation of 
the term monster supports this interpretation: the Latin monstrum means both por-
tent and abnormal birth.20  The monster’s role in establishing and reinforcing norms 
of conduct reflects an ambiguity in the concept of the normal.  On the one hand, the 
normal is the statistically average, on the other hand, the normal is the right, and 
norms tend to make right.  Deviations from right conduct are unnatural, and are con-
sidered both strange and horrible.21  The history of the monster is the history of a 
conception of right conduct such that deviations from right conduct are unnatural, 
both strange and horrible.  
In the seventeenth century, fear and loathing of sinful behavior in the United 
States, behavior widely believed to be caused by witches, was largely a response to 
what minister, Rhode Island founder, and advocate of religious tolerance, Roger 
Williams called “this wild and howling land.”22  Contrary to Williams’ arguments 
for religious tolerance, Massachussetts religious leader John Cotton urged religious 
persecution as a way to curb the “diseased” elements of society and maintain civic 
order.23  Cotton, like many of his contemporaries in the Colonies, believed that sin-
fulness was a part of human nature, rendering man vulnerable to the attractions of 
sinful conduct.  Protection of the public required banishment and persecution of sin-
ners, as well as the creation, and subsequent burning of witches.  Ironically, the 
depth of the terror caused by this type of social hysteria is in part responsible for the 
reaction to fear in the form of religious tolerance.24  Thus, the incarnation of people 
who engaged in bad behavior as monsters, i.e., witches, played a powerful role in the 
development of both religious tolerance and intolerance in the United States.25
19. Davidson, supra note 14, at 103–04 (quoting Ambroise Paré).
20. Bates, supra note 15, at 13.
21. Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance 115–24 (1986).
22. Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience 38 (2008). 
23. Id. at 38.
24. Id. at 40.
25. Id. at 39–40.
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Beginning in the eighteenth century, the monster was transformed into the 
moral monster.  As philosopher Michel Foucault puts it, “Monstrosity . . . is no 
longer the undue mixture of what should be separated by nature.  It is simply an ir-
regularity, a slight deviation, but one that makes possible something that really will 
be a monstrosity, that is to say, the monstrosity of character.”26  The criminal exem-
plified this monstrosity of character through his social deviance.  Transposing the 
theological and religious trope of the monster into a mixture of criminological and 
psychiatric terms, the current conception of the psychopath or person with an anti-
social personality disorder inhabits the social role of the monster, playing on the 
ambiguity of the normal/abnormal distinction.  The moral monster, or criminal, 
triggers abjection, and can only be detected by the use of techniques developed by 
experts.27  Psychiatric experts are presumably skilled in detecting creatures that enjoy, 
or are indifferent to, the pain of others.28
Creatures that cannot sympathize with the pain of others must be regarded as 
not fully human, and therefore can be, and perhaps must be, segregated.  They are 
predators.  The sexuality of Saint Thomas Aquinas’s monster and the psychopathy of 
the naturalized monster is the modern sex offender.  Committing sexual offenses has 
now become a kind of madness that frightens us because it suggests a loss of control 
over sexuality, a central element of an integrated sense of self.  The narratives about 
sex offending in the United States frame perverse desires as essential to the personal 
identity of offenders, and promote their legal segregation as a way to enforce sexual 
boundaries, rather than as bad acts that persons perform and for which they may be 
punished within the criminal justice system.29  Our secular techniques for coping 
with this threat are treatment and incarceration, both of which target sex offenders 
as deviant predators.  When sex offenders are framed as monsters, we hardly notice 
that they are also targets of discriminatory, retributive policies.
Discrimination against those who deviate from the normal and normative white, 
male, straight, sexually tame, and physically and cognitively unimpaired, has been 
the subject of a great deal of scholarship, much of which emphasizes the difficulties 
outsiders have in being included, not only in mainstream culture, but in routine 
democratic political practice.30  Erving Goffman captured precisely the relationship 
between the normal and the abnormal, and the power of stigma in American social 
life:
26. Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collége de France 1974–1975, at 73 (Arnold I. 
Davidson, ed., Graham Burchell, trans., Picador 2003) (1999).
27. See, e.g., Robert Hare, Welcome to “Without Conscience”: Robert Hare’s Website Devoted to the Study 
of Psychopathy, http://www.hare.org (last visited Oct. 8, 2008) (Robert Hare has developed a well-
tested instrument for detecting psychopathy called the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised).
28. Douard, supra note 14, at 41.
29. Garfinkle, supra note 13, at 176–77.
30. Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy 81–120 (2000) (arguing that norms of robust 
democratic deliberation require acknowledging important differences among people and groups, rather 
than marginalizing those differences in the interest of seeking a “common good”).
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[I]n an important sense there is only one complete unblushing male in 
America: a young, married, white, urban, northern, heterosexual Protestant 
father of college education, fully employed, of good complexion, weight and 
height, and a recent record in sports.31
When Goffman wrote those words, the United States was on the verge of a 
decade-long nervous breakdown that is often considered a watershed moment in his-
tory, and one which changed the boundaries around what was considered normal in 
terms of color, gender, and sexual orientation.32  Goffman’s characterization of the 
“unblushing male” remains, however, the prototypical normal individual.  Differences 
continue to be grounds for stigmatization if we but scratch our surface politeness. 
Paradigmatic outsiders are now likely to be terrorists, illegal aliens, violent criminals, 
and sex offenders, who are widely regarded as domestic terrorists.
The usual academic examination of the role of otherness in achieving social and 
political unity focuses on those who have done nothing wrong, but who are simply 
different.  When the targets of revulsion and fear are people of color, gays, women, 
Hispanics, and the disabled, exclusion now seems indefensible.33  Most scholars, 
however, have not examined people who are stigmatized because they have engaged 
in conduct dangerous to themselves or others.  In the United States, sanism is as 
virulent as, but more rarely noticed than, racism and sexism; discrimination against 
violent offenders is virtually invisible, because their criminal conduct creates a pre-
text to isolate them as sources of contamination.34  Dangerously violent offenders may, 
of course, harm us, but to treat them as contaminants requiring isolation is a classic 
example of scapegoating.35
Fear and loathing of violent offenders, however, are also social and psychological 
responses to difference.  The criminal justice system in the United States has created 
categories of monstrous crimes, one social function of which is social unity: we can 
join together in holding in contempt people who have committed such crimes as sex 
offenses, selling drugs to children, serial or mass killings, and, newest upon the 
stage, Islamic terrorism.  The defining feature of such monstrous crimes is that those 
who commit them have no advocates, apart from a small group of criminal defense 
31. Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity 128 (Simon & 
Schuster 1986) (1963).
32. The 1960s were characterized by significant upheavals in culture, politics, and social structure.  This 
was the era of the civil rights, antiwar, feminist, and gay rights movements.  See Susan Jacoby, The 
Age of American Unreason 131–62 (2008) (arguing that the 1960s contained both rebellious rights 
movements and growing conservative ideologies, which were to take root 15 years later).
33. See generally Martha Nussbaum, Hiding From Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law 75–87 
(2004).
34. See generally, Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 SMU L. Rev. 373 (1992) (defining sanism as an 
irrational prejudice toward mentally ill persons, similar to other irrational prejudices). 
35. See Mona Lynch, Pedophiles and Cyber-Predators as Contaminating Forces: The Language of Disgust, 
Pollution, and Boundary Invasions in Federal Debates on Sex Offender Legislation, 27 Law & Soc. Inquiry 
529, 540 (2002). 
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attorneys, forensic experts, and legal scholars who recognize that categories of mon-
strous crimes can lead to deeply immoral and unconstitutional discrimination.36  
Criminal offenders and the dangerously mentally ill have few advocates in their 
fight against discrimination primarily because criminal offenders are not perceived 
of as innocent victims of discrimination, and the dangerously mentally ill appear in-
capable of even minimal social cooperation.  Sex offenders have elements of both 
groups: many (though not all) have committed terrible and violent crimes, sometimes 
against prepubescent or very young adolescent children; and they appear mentally 
disordered and addicted to harmful deviant sexual conduct.  Nonetheless, sex of-
fenders are constructed as other in a way that is different from most violent criminals: 
society treats them as monsters.  By framing sex offenders as monsters, we not only 
dehumanize them, we also hide from our own anxieties about deviant sexual conduct 
and undermine rational strategies for addressing such conduct and the damage it 
causes.37
C. Scapegoats and the Social Utility of Outsiders
The media describes certain categories of crime, such as serial murder and sex 
offenses, as monstrous, and the perpetrators of such crimes as monsters.  Our current 
monsters serve the same role as they always have served: as scapegoats.  A sign that 
men who commit sex offenses are scapegoats is that, contrary to common belief, sex 
offending recidivism rates are relatively low, while strategies for preventing recidi-
vism are designed to permanently banish the offender from society.  The underlying 
purpose for targeting sex offenders for special punishment is therefore less likely to 
be the legal aim of regulating disapproved conduct, but rather the affirmation of the 
orthodox moral order.
As noted above, society has historically created and defeated monsters to restore 
and affirm the morality of normal people.  When certain persons are reframed as 
monsters, a line is drawn between us and them, a demarcation that lends itself to 
scapegoating them.  Targeting scapegoats typically occurs during periods of social 
and cultural crisis.  As law professor Joseph Kennedy observes:
The essence of scapegoating lies in the attribution of an internal problem to 
an external source.  In the contemporary child abuse scare, the violent sexual 
predator of children, whose sexual appetites and violent tendencies are so 
deviant from social norms as to place them outside of normal society, is that 
external source.  The violent sexual predator becomes a scapegoat, however, 
when the scope of social suffering laid at his feet is far greater than the facts 
merit, when a problem that is actually internal to society is projected on to 
36. That these advocates are themselves stigmatized—“How could you represent (treat) such monsters?”—
was recently pointed out to me by social worker Stacey Caraballo, who is analyzing this important, but 
largely unnoticed, phenomenon.
37. See Pamela D. Schultz, Not Monsters: Analyzing the Stories of Child Molesters 184–85 
(2005) (arguing, on the basis of detailed interviews with convicted sex offenders, that framing them as 
monsters not only dehumanizes them, robbing them of the capacity for choice, but undermines 
treatment).
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someone who is clearly outside of society in an important sense of the 
word.38
Relying on Emile Durkheim’s conception of social solidarity, Kennedy argues force-
fully that monstrous crimes, including sex oﬀ enses, create solidarity in an increasingly 
fragmented social life in the United States.
Kennedy suggests that the sex offender becomes a scapegoat when the scope of 
social suffering attributed to him is far greater than the facts merit.  Kennedy is cor-
rect for two reasons.  First, the overwhelming legal response to sex offenders is 
disproportionate to their recidivism rate, which recent studies report as being rela-
tively low.  According to a United States Justice Department study that tracked 9,691 
male sex offenders for the three years following their release from prison and re-
ported on findings related to their recidivism, 3.2% of released rapists were 
re-convicted for another rape, and of all sex offenders released in 1994, only 3.5% 
were re-convicted of a sex crime within the three-year follow-up period.  The study 
further reports that of this group of offenders, the percentage rearrested for a sex 
crime against a child was only 2.2%.  Of those, 1.4% were rapists and 2.5% were 
sexual assaulters.39  Other studies place the recidivism rate at about 13.4%.40 
Interestingly the press rarely discusses the disagreement about the recidivism rate, 
but rather chooses to focus on the more aggressive numbers supporting the societal 
misconception that sex offenders are inherently repeat offenders. 
Further, a curious feature of the fear of sex offenders, and the feature that lies at 
the heart of our condemnation of the sex offender, is that many sex offenders engage 
in conduct that is not as deviant as we want to believe.  Many sex offenders served 
their prison terms for engaging in consensual sexual conduct with post-pubescent 
adolescents, and studies show that sexual attraction to post-pubescent adolescents is 
statistically normal.41  If those studies are accurate and reliable, the implication is 
that many of us have socially disapproved sexual interests that are statistically normal 
so long as we do not act on them.
In addition to providing a focus of social solidarity, scapegoats absolve us from 
guilt.  Professor René Girard, who analyzes myths for their social meanings, called 
violent scapegoating “that enigmatic quality that pervades the judicial system when 
that system replaces sacrifice.  This obscurity coincides with the transcendental ef-
fectiveness of a violence that is holy, legal, and legitimately successfully opposed to a 
38. Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 
Hastings L.J. 829, 882 (2000).
39. Patrick A. Langan et al., Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in , U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 30–36 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf.
40. R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussière, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism 
Studies, 66 J. of Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 348 (1998).  But see Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. 
Harris, What Population and What Question?, 48 Canadian J. of Criminology & Crim. Just. 95, 97 
(2006) (placing recidivism risk at 24% or higher).
41. Karen Franklin, Invasion of the Hebephile Hunters, In the News: Forensic Psychology, Criminology, 
and Psychology, Oct. 31, 2007, http://forensicpsychologist.blogspot.com/2007/10/invasion-of-
hebephile-hunters.html.
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violence that is unjust, illegal, and illegitimate.”42  Girard argues that during periods 
of social crisis scapegoats are identified with common characteristics:
First, there are violent crimes which choose as object those people whom it is 
most criminal to attack, either in the absolute sense or in reference to the in-
dividual committing the act: a king, a father, the symbol of supreme authority, 
and in biblical and modern societies the weakest and most defenseless, espe-
cially young children.  Then there are sexual crimes: rape, incest, bestiality.  
The ones most frequently invoked transgress the taboos that are considered 
the strictest in the society in question . . . .  Ultimately, the persecutors always 
convince themselves that a small number of people, or even a single indi-
vidual, despite his relative weakness, is extremely harmful to the whole of 
society.43
Similarly, Kirkegaard and Nothey identify four characteristics of scapegoating:
 1. It emerges when society is in a period of crisis.
 2. Acts that blatantly offend societal standards and threaten a sense 
  of proper hierarchy are widely regarded as legitimate targets.
 3. The target has stigmata of the victim.
 4.  The target is subjected to violence, including legal violence.44
Th e scapegoating of sex oﬀ enders has all four characteristics, and in the United States 
sex oﬀ enders are widely regarded as extraordinarily harmful to the social fabric as a 
whole.
D. Scapegoats and Moral Panic45
In the United States, sex offenders are the targets of “moral panic.”  During a 
period of moral panic, 
[a] person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to soci-
etal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical 
fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, 
bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited ex-
perts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or 
(more often) resorted to . . . .46 
Sex oﬀ enders have been targets of moral panics more than once in the history of the 
42. René Girard, Violence and the Sacred 24 (Patrick Gregory trans., Continuum Int’l Publ’n Group 
2005) (1972) [hereinafter Girard, Violence].
43. René Girard, The Scapegoat 15 (Yvonne Freccero trans., The Johns Hopkins University Press 1986) 
(1982).
44. Hugh Kirkegaard & Wayne Northey, The Sex Offender as Scapegoat: Vigilante Violence and a Faith 
Community Response, Colloquium on Violence and Religion (1999), http://www.helping-people.
info/articles/scapegoat_text.htm.
45. In this section, I draw on material from John Douard & Pamela Schultz, The Sex Offender—The 
Monstrous Other, in VI The Sex Offender: Offender Evaluation and Program Strategies 1-1 to 
1-22 (Barbara K. Schwartz ed., 2008).
46. Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics i (3d ed. 2002).
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United States.47  During these periods of moral panic, sex oﬀ enders are scapegoated, 
for which they receive little sympathy even after the moral panic subsides.
The moral panic over sex offending emerged in the United States in the context 
of imposing increasingly harsh punishments on violent criminals, presumably re-
flecting a crisis of confidence in a criminal justice system incapable of predicting the 
future dangerousness of violent offenders.48  The legal response to sex offending, as 
Kennedy argues, was part of the designation of a number of crimes as monsterous 
out of a sense of lawlessness or anomie.49  In the 1970s and 1980s, determinate sen-
tencing, such as mandatory minimum sentences and mandatory extended sentences, 
seemed to be a solution both to the racial disparities in sentencing and to growing 
anxieties about violent criminal behavior.  Breakdown of a sense of social solidarity 
after the 1960s upheavals seemed to require both less judicial sentencing discretion 
and more severe penalties.  Anxiety about child sexual abuse emerged in this con-
text.50
Child sexual abuse is the paradigmatic category of sex offense.  Parents, and es-
pecially fathers, who forsake their socially valued role as their children’s caretakers 
disrupt the basic family hierarchy that to a large extent defines the civilizing process 
in the United States.  Father-as-caretaker is a powerful metaphor that extends even 
to political leaders who fan fears of terrorism.  Sex offenders threaten our standards 
of parental responsibility, just as political terrorists threaten our standards of political 
responsibility, and both are regarded as legitimate targets of scapegoating.
Sex offenders are widely regarded within the therapeutic community as having 
themselves been abused as children.51  They are viewed as sharing the stigma of their 
victims.  A significant component of sex offender treatment consists of eliciting from 
offenders stories of their own childhood abuse.  Child abuse, in fact, is considered 
one factor responsible for fixing the offender’s personality as antisocial.52
Sex offenders are clearly being subjected to legal violence, if we understand vio-
lence to include long periods of imprisonment.  As Yale law professor Robert Cover 
47. See generally Philip Jenkins, Moral Panic: Changing Concepts of the Child Molester in 
Modern America (1998) (analyzing the periodic emergence of moral panic over child sex abuse since 
the 1930s).
48. Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incarceration in 
America 77–114 (2006) (describing the increasingly retributive “carceral state” that focused on 
“victims”); Christopher Slobogin, Proving the Unprovable: The Role of Law, Science, and 
Speculation in Adjusting Culpability 99–130 (2007) [hereinafter Slobogin, Proving the 
Unprovable] (examining the increasing role of experts in predicting future dangerousness, and the 
complexity of such determinations); David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social 
Order in Contemproary Society (2001) (arguing generally that fear of crime and neoconservative 
politics has reconfigured the criminal justice system in the United States and Great Britain in ways that 
ref lect insecurities about social order).
49. Kennedy, supra note 38, at 860–82.
50. Id. at 852–55.
51. Eric S. Janus, Failure to Protect: America’s Sexual Predator Laws and the Rise of the 
Preventive State 51 (2006) [hereinafter Janus, Failure to Protect].
52. Theodore Millon et al., Personality Disorders in Modern Life 184–86 (2d ed. 2004).
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argues, courts enact violence whenever they impose punishments that result in prison 
terms, not to mention the most severe punishment: the death penalty.53  Moreover, 
incarceration does not end with the termination of a sex offender’s prison term, be-
cause he is often civilly committed under punitive circumstances.54  Even when 
released into the community, the movements of sex offenders are subject to severe 
constraints by Megan’s Laws.55  Furthermore, whereas criminal offenders released 
from prison are generally described as ex-offenders, sex offenders are called sex of-
fenders even after they are released from prison.  Individuals convicted of sex offenses 
cannot escape the sex offender designation, in part because they are not simply per-
petrators of monstrous crimes, but rather they are believed to have monstrous 
characters.  As will be discussed in the next section of this article, the legal violence 
imposed on sex offenders does not end with the completion of their prison terms.
One other feature of scapegoating is its entertainment value.  Mythologies about 
Evil Incarnate have always played social functions, both as a focus of solidarity and 
as a source of pleasure.  As religion scholar David Frankfurter points out:
[T]he construction of the social Other as cannibal-savage, demon, sorcerer, 
vampire, or amalgam of them all, draws upon a consistent repertoire of sym-
bols of inversion.  The stories we tell about people out on the periphery play 
with their savagery, libertine customs, and monstrosity.  At the same time, 
the combined horror and pleasure we derive from contemplating their 
Otherness . . . certainly affect us at the level of individual fantasy, as well.56
In light of such socially useful, albeit unarticulated, purposes served by framing 
sex offenders as monsters, framing them as antisocial personalities or paraphilics is 
far less entertaining, and far more threatening, than watching them degraded and 
busted on television shows in the United States like To Catch a Predator.57  If sex of-
fenders are indeed monsters, then they are so qualitatively different from us that they 
can be segregated without concern for their rights or for finding avenues for their 
reentry into society.  If, however, they are only quantitatively different on a con-
tinuum of behavioral disorders, concern for contamination is likely to trigger moral 
panic: a social crisis over run-away sex offenders in our midst. 
Scapegoats are identified as bearers of evil but also serve the function of a “sin-
eater,” a person or animal that averts away from the community its desire for 
53. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L. J. 1601, 1601–07 (1986).
54. For example, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.25 (West 2008), which civilly commits sex offenders indefinitely 
after expiration of their criminal terms.  Civil committees have annual review hearings, but since the 
statute’s inception in 1999, only about 85 out of approximately 400 have been released.
55. New Jersey’s Megan’s Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-1 (West 2005), is long and complex, but it includes 
three levels of registration requirements, placement of names on the internet, and GPS bracelet for the 
second and third level of registration.
56. David Frankfurter, Evil Incarnate: Rumors of Demonic Conspiracy and Satanic Abuse in 
History 208–09 (2006).
57. See generally To Catch a Predator (NBC television broadcast) (televising the capture and arrest of child 
predators who proposition news journalists posing as children online).
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self-destruction.58  Rene Girard calls this need for a surrogate victim of violence “mi-
metic desire,” and states that “[a]s the catalyst for the sacrificial crisis, it would 
eventually destroy the entire community if the surrogate victim were not at hand to 
halt the process . . . .”59  Mimetic desire is a community’s way of transforming its vio-
lent desires into not only harmless, but even cathartic, public displays.  In ancient 
Greece, theater provided a source of mimetic desire.  In modern Western culture, 
laws that are the subject of media attention and television shows may perform the 
same function for the sources of moral panic.
Sexual offenses have been a major source of moral panic for the past several 
years, and the panic does not appear to be subsiding.60  There is much to gain for 
stakeholders in moral panic: media, politicians, the legal and therapeutic communi-
ties, and the general public.  Sex offenders are frequently the targets of violence 
much the way Oedipus was the target of violence in Sophocles’ Oedipus the King—he 
was responsible for all the ills that had befallen his people.61  Tiresias told Oedipus 
he was the pollution that caused the plague in Thebes.62  Of course, Oedipus did no 
such thing, but he was also not innocent.  There is certainly a sense in which Oedipus 
was guilty of the sins of which he was accused—incest and patricide—however, he 
was also scapegoated to settle the anxieties of his adopted community.  I suggest that 
the sex offender, while certainly not innocent, is also being used as a scapegoat for 
our anxieties about the sexualized role of children in American society, and our fear 
that sexual desires, including harmful sexual desires, are part of the human condi-
tion.
Sex offenders are scapegoated, but does scapegoating sex offenders effectively 
combat the crimes they commit or merely assuage our guilt?  Undeniably, child sexual 
abuse is a stigmatizing crime for good reasons, as it results in the violation of the 
weakest, most vulnerable members of a society.  Nonetheless, the value of stigma-
tizing the crime does not warrant stigmatizing the offenders through disgust, 
humiliation, isolation, and exclusion, because in doing so, we undermine efforts to 
understand and treat sex offenders.  Scapegoating does not identify and operation-
alize a social problem; it increases the likelihood we will avoid the problem.  The 
socially constructed image of the sex offender as Monstrous Other ironically imbues 
the crime and the perpetrator with mythological import, allowing society to view the 
sex offender as one who cannot engage in self-reflection and restraint, and is inca-
pable of the degree of rational control we attribute to persons.
58. Bertram S. Puckle, Funeral Customs 46 (Forgotten Books 2008) (1926) (“[I]t was the province of 
the human scapegoat to take upon himself the moral trespasses of his client—and whatever the 
consequences might be in the after life—in return for a miserable fee and a scanty meal.”).
59. Girard, Violence, supra note 42, at 158.
60. See generally Jenkins, supra note 47.
61. Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus 13–19 (Peter Meineck & Paul Woodruff trans., Hackett Publ’g 
2000).
62. Id.
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III. SEX OFFENDER AS MONSTER: THE LEGAL RESPONSE
Laws in the United States banish convicted sex offenders from social participa-
tion, not simply with criminal incarceration for acts committed in the past, but also 
with social strategies that severely constrain their liberties after they have been re-
leased from prison.  In this section, I examine the use of psychiatric diagnoses to 
create mechanisms of preventive detention.  Psychiatrists and psychologists are en-
listed, by lawmakers, to provide grounds for marking off sex offenders as dangerous 
individuals.  Certain kinds of sexual disorders are regarded by psychiatrists as so se-
verely limiting the cognitive, affective, and volitional capacities of persons who suffer 
from them, as to require the creation of laws to protect the public from future sex 
offenses by individuals so aff licted.  Psychiatric diagnoses attribute abnormal mental 
states to people who engage in harmful sexual conduct.63  But the attribution of ab-
normal mental states constitutes a rhetorical transformation of the criminal into the 
monster in terms that are acceptable to a modern secular society.  
A. Statutes and the Courts Banish Sex Offenders from Social Participation
Both statutory and common law banishes sex offenders from participation in 
common social networks, marking them as acceptable targets of scapegoating.  A 
recent example of legal efforts to isolate, if not banish, sex offenders is the Georgia 
sex offender residency statute that would prohibit former sex offenders currently reg-
istered under that state’s Megan’s Law from living within 1,000 feet of “areas where 
minors congregate,”64 including “all public and private parks and recreation facilities, 
playgrounds, skating rinks, neighborhood centers, gymnasiums, school bus stops, and 
public swimming pools.”65  Such residency restrictions are being implemented in 
several states, but Georgia’s is instructive.  Not only are sex offenders prohibited from 
living within 1,000 feet of schools or public parks, as is the case in most residency 
restriction laws, but they are prohibited from living within 1,000 feet of school bus 
stops.  In effect, released sex offenders can live nowhere.
The most extensive deprivation of the liberty of sex offenders is not imprison-
ment or Megan’s Law registration, but involuntary civil commitment statutes: 
sexually violent predator acts (“SVPAs”).  Once criminal incarceration of sex of-
fenders has reached its constitutional limit, SVPAs allow for the indefinite 
incarceration of sex offenders in civil commitment facilities based on vague diag-
noses of “mental abnormality or personality disorder.”66  During these indefinite 
63. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders defines a class of sexual disorders as 
paraphilia.  Included in this class are pedophilia and sexual sadism.  Am. Psychiatric Ass’n., The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 8, (4th ed., text rev. 1994) [hereinafter 
DSM-IV-TR].
64. Ga. Code Ann. § 41-1-15 (West 2006) (repealed 2008).
65. Ga. Code Ann. § 41-1-12 (West 2006) (emphasis added) (repealed 2008).  
66. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-24.25 (West 1999).
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commitments, individuals are often provided with only rudimentary cognitive be-
havioral treatment, the efficacy of which is unknown.67  
The first SVPA was enacted in Washington state in 1990, but there was a civil 
commitment program in Washington as early as 1971, run by the state’s mental 
health department, called the Sexual Psychopath Program.68  
Currently, in nineteen states and the District of Columbia,69 persons convicted 
of one or more sex offenses may be involuntarily, civilly committed at the end of their 
criminal terms if they: (1) suffer from mental disorders that render them highly likely 
to commit sexually violent offenses because they suffer from a mental abnormality or 
personality disorder that (2) limits their ability to control their sex-offending behav-
ior.70  Facially, these statutes place the burden on the state to show that sex offenders 
meet a standard of dangerousness set by the United States Supreme Court.  In prac-
tice, however, the burden often falls on the ex-offender to prove he does not meet 
that standard.71  
Although civilly committed sex offenders are entitled under SVPA statutes to 
periodic review hearings to determine whether they remain committable, in my own 
experience representing civilly committed sex offenders, they are rarely released.  In 
New Jersey, where I practice law, review hearings are virtually pro forma repetitions 
of the same diagnoses and risk assessments the State’s experts presented at the initial 
hearings, heard by the same judges during bench trials.  The standard of proof is 
clear and convincing evidence, because these are civil, and not criminal, trials. 
Moreover, because civil commitment is not legally regarded as criminal punishment, 
but as protective of society, civil committees are not afforded the constitutional pro-
tections given to convicted criminals, such as the rights against ex post facto laws and 
double jeopardy.72  Nonetheless, the conditions in which offenders are held are ex-
tremely punitive, and offenders committed under SVPAs certainly suffer substantial 
loss of liberty.73
67. See Ctr. for Sex Offender Mgmt., Dep’t of Justice, Recidivism of Sex Offenders, (2001), 
available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.html.  This authoritative assessment indicates the 
paucity of information on treatment effects. 
68. Barbara K. Schwartz, Overview of Rehabilitative Efforts in Understanding and Managing Sexually Coercive 
Behaviors, 989 Annals of the N.Y. Academy of Sciences 360, 360–83 (2003).
69. States with some form of civil commitment of sexually violent offender statutes are: New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, Kansas, Virginia, Washington, Illinois, Florida, California, Colorado, 
Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, Arizona, Missouri, South Carolina, and 
Texas.  Texas is the only state with an outpatient civil commitment program, though several other states 
are considering that alternative.
70. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.24, et seq. (West 1999).
71. Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 4, 2007, at A1. 
72. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 263 (2001) (holding that respondent could not obtain “as applied” relief 
on ex post facto or double jeopardy grounds).
73. State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1238 (N.J. 2003) (“Confinement under the [Act] is theoretically 
without end.  In that sense, it constitutes a greater liberty deprivation than that imposed upon a criminal 
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Despite the stark contrast between the rights afforded to incarcerated criminals 
and those afforded to civil committees, SVPA statutes were found constitutional in 
key United States Supreme Court decisions.  For example, in Kansas v. Hendricks, 
the Court found that sex offenders have a diminished right to liberty if they are 
mentally abnormal, even though not mentally ill. 74  In Kansas v. Crane, the Court 
permitted commitment when the state can prove an offender has “serious difficulty” 
controlling his sex-offending behavior. 75  The state need only prove to the satisfac-
tion of a jury or a judge that a sex offender has substantial volitional impairment to 
support commitment.76  Certain psychiatric diagnoses, defined in the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition, Text 
Revision (DSM-IV-TR), are generally used to support a claim by the state that a sex 
offender suffers from a substantial volitional impairment, most commonly one of the 
paraphilias or personality disorders (or the older category of psychopathy, which is 
most closely approximated in the DSM-IV-TR by antisocial personality disorder).77 
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) has disavowed the use of the DSM-
IV-TR to categorize persons as disordered for the purpose of predicting future 
behavior, or for any other forensic use, but these warnings have gone unheeded.78
On the face of it, framing sex offenders as mentally disordered, if not mentally 
ill, does not incorporate the normative characteristics of the monster frame.  While 
their behavior may be construed as monstrous, these statutes appear to hold out hope 
that sex offenders may become normalized by accepting that they cannot control 
their behavior without life-long therapy and persistent attention to triggers.  The 
resemblance to treatment for alcohol or drug abuse is not accidental: cognitive be-
defendant who, in all but a handful of cases, is given a maximum release date.” (quoting In re Civil 
Commitment of D.L., 797 A.2d 166, 168 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002))).
74. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
75. 534 U.S. 407, 407 (2002).
76. In re Civil Commitment of W.Z., 801 A.2d 205 (N.J. 2002) (holding that New Jersey’s SVPA is 
constitutional).
77. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 63, at 301.7.
78. See Brief for American Psychiatric Ass’n as Amicus Curiae at 4, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) 
(No. 82-6080) (“The unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness is by 
now an established fact within the profession.”).  Despite the APA’s position, the Court in Barefoot 
found that the DSM diagnostic categories could be used to make such predictions.  463 U.S. at 896–963 
(affirming the district court’s conclusion that the accuracy of psychiatric predictions is “within the 
province of the jury to resolve”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217, as recognized in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 
473 (2000).
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havioral treatment incorporates the twelve steps of Alcoholics Anonymous.79  And 
like all addicts, treatment theoretically provides a form of reentry into society.80  
However, in practice, no such hope is realized, because the civil committees are 
rarely, if ever, released.  The basis for commitment is the attribution to sex offenders 
of an essential trait that differentiates us from them.  The trait may be antisocial 
personality disorder, paraphilia, impulse control disorder, or some combination of 
disorders.  What these disorders have in common is that the criteria used to diagnose 
a person include the claim that these characteristics are relatively stable, if not per-
manent, qualities.81  As the classical conception of the monster differentiated monsters 
from normal people in terms of physical and characterological traits, so the sex of-
fender is differentiated from normal people in terms of personality traits and sexual 
dispositions.  We remain in the grip of moral panic, which I will now argue has less 
to do with fear of the outsider’s harmful conduct than fear of contamination by mon-
sters.  For sex offenders to serve as scapegoats, and targets of moral panic, they must 
remain outsiders.
B. Scapegoating the Monsters Among Us: A Test Case for the Preventive State?
While sanism results in discrimination against the mentally ill, a therapeutic 
culture has developed in the United States that seems antithetical to construing psy-
chiatric patients as monsters.  At the heart of the insanity defense against criminal 
punishment of the mentally ill, is that they are not culpable for their acts.82  The 
scapegoating of those society frames as monsters must, at the very least, hold that 
monsters are blameworthy, but mental illness is a ground for holding that a criminal 
defendant is incapable of controlling her or his behavior.  Appearances to the con-
trary notwithstanding, the conferring of mentally disordered status on a person is a 
new way to create classes of outsiders that has much in common with designating 
outsiders as monsters.  To say of a person that she is mentally ill seems to confer a 
status that does not imply moral judgment.  However, mental illness marks the 
person as different, as abnormal.  But to be abnormal is to be strange, much as mon-
sters were thought to be strange, as described above, during the Renaissance.  
However, as the Court held in Kansas v. Crane, a convicted sex offender may be 
diagnosed vaguely with a mental abnormality or personality disorder that leaves him 
79. Cognitive behavioral therapy (“CBT”) explores ways for people with psychological problems to change 
their thought processes.  A similar approach to developing coping skills is implicit in twelve-step 
programs, which focus on addictions.  Cognitive patterns that lead to drinking or drug use are identified 
in twelve-step programs, and CBT techniques are employed in treatment programs.  A similar linking 
of twelve-step programs to CBT is found in sex offender treatment.  See Henry Tarkington, Cognitive 
Behavioral Therapy in Substance Abuse Treatment, First-Step Services, LLC, http://www.firststepgarner.
com/congnitive.html.  
80. See Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Underwager, Sex Offender Treatment, Inst. Psych. Therap. J. (1991), 
available at http://www.ipt-forensics.com/journal/volume3/j3_1_2.htm (explaining that treatment 
programs should encourage social behavior).
81. See Janus, Failure to Protect, supra note 51, at 101–05.
82. Slobogin, Proving the Unprovable, supra note 48, at 7.
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substantially, but not completely, volitionally impaired such that he poses sufficient 
risk to be civilly committed indefinitely at the expiration of his prison term.83  While 
a sex offender is culpable for his monstrous acts, he remains sufficiently dangerous 
(due to volitional impairments) to be confined until he has been treated to the satis-
faction of mental health experts.
Now, the very idea of future dangerousness suggests that a person who has com-
mitted a monstrous crime has a monstrous character.  A sex offender has not only 
committed a predatory sexual act, but is intrinsically predatory.  To frame a predatory 
character trait as a disordered personality, I suggest, is a rhetorically powerful form 
of scapegoating when the personality-disordered person is held responsible for what 
is widely regarded as an alarming increase in sexual violence.  As Pamela Schultz, 
who has interviewed incarcerated child molesters and found them to be “not mon-
sters,” points out, despite studies that indicate sex offenders are far less likely to 
reoffend than non-sex offenders, “the myth remains that child molesters have a vastly 
higher recidivism rate than any other type of offender.”84
The United States Supreme Court has encouraged the myth of future danger-
ousness, particularly with respect to sex offenders.  In Barefoot v. Estelle, the Court 
held admissible psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness, despite the demurrer 
by the American Psychiatric Association that psychiatrists possess no special exper-
tise entitling them to predict future dangerousness.85  A few years later, the Court in 
Kansas v. Hendricks found that sexual predator statutes that rely on such predictions 
do not violate due process, despite noting evidence that “it was not possible to predict 
with any degree of accuracy the future dangerousness of a sex offender.”86  While it 
is true that recent work in actuarial methods of recidivism risk assessment that place 
offenders in statistical risk categories primarily on the basis of static characteristics 
have proven to be more reliable and valid than psychiatric diagnoses in predicting 
risk of reoffense, SVPAs and courts continue to rely heavily on psychiatric diagnostic 
categories.87
Psychiatric categories, however, differentiate us from them, the normal from the 
abnormal, in terms of a characteristic that inclines the sexual offender to commit 
monstrous acts of sexual violence.  That characteristic—paraphilia, personality dis-
order, or impulse control disorder—marks the sex offender as the moral monster who 
83. 534 U.S. 407, 411–14 (2002).
84. Pamela D. Schultz, Not Monsters: Analyzing the Stories of Child Molesters 184 (2005).
85. 463 U.S. 880, 896–903 (1983).
86. 521 U.S. at 355 n.2; id. at 357–61; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (“Given the lack 
of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state 
could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be 
dangerous.”).
87. See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: 
Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1443 (2003).  
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is highly likely to commit such crimes.88  The attribution to a person of a character-
istic responsible for his deviant sexual conduct focuses social concern on that inner 
trait rather than the criminal conduct for which the person was punished.  But a 
prison term lasts only as long as a constitutionally appropriate sentence permits.89 
Civil commitment, however, may last as long as the enduring characteristic attrib-
uted to the offender—the diagnosis—may affect his behavior.
So long as the criminal justice system in the United States rests on the assump-
tion that people should be punished for their acts and not for their status,90 criminal 
punishment for sex offenses will be limited by constitutional protections against cruel 
and unusual punishment.  Sex offenders, however, are widely regarded as having a 
status—dangerousness—that warrants indefinite liberty deprivation.  
The monster frame both enables and triggers the special status we assign to sex 
offenders.  If sex offenders are described as monsters rather than persons, it is easier 
to view them as permanently so psychologically deviant that they are always tempted 
to engage in harmful sexual conduct.  Their confinement, courts hold, serves a ra-
tional social purpose, and because they are regarded as mentally disordered (but not 
severely mentally ill), they are not a completely protected class.91  Laws that deprive 
sex offenders of liberty are not subject to the highest standard of constitutional re-
view, as Kansas v. Hendricks established.92
Sex offenders are a convenient target of legal scapegoating because, according to 
our social mythology of the mental disorders that are thought to cause deviant sexual 
conduct, they can never be reintegrated into society.  They are forever outsiders who 
can be subjected to loss of liberty—legal violence—without triggering much sym-
pathy.  Our anxieties about social anomie, especially with respect to sexual disorders, 
can be blamed on sex offenders with impunity.  Moreover, the law can be deployed to 
legitimize scapegoating sex offenders. 
There is growing interest in shifting the goal of criminal justice from retribution 
to preventive detention, so long as certain substantive due process rights are not vio-
lated when violent offenders are found to be mentally ill and requiring civil 
88. It is worth noting that actuarial risk assessment instruments, like their models in the insurance industry, 
are statistical categories that organize all members of a population into risk categories.  Just as every 
automobile driver seeking insurance is given a risk rating by an insurance actuary, so everyone can be 
given a sex offender risk rating.
89. See U.S. Const., amend. VIII.  In Solem v. Helm, the U.S. Supreme Court held that incarceration might 
be cruel and unusual if its duration is “disproportionate” to the severity of the offense.  463 U.S. 277 
(1983).  This holding was modified in Harmelin v. Michigan, in which the Court held that for non-
capital offenses, incarceration duration fell under the eighth amendment only if it is “grossly 
disproportionate” to the severity of the offense. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).  However, a life term for a non-
capital offense would be open to constitutional challenge.  Id.
90. The United States Supreme Court has long held that a status, such as being a drug addict, is not a 
criminal offense, in part because status is not conduct.  See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) 
(striking down a California criminal statute making it a crime to be addicted to narcotics).
91. See Janus, Failure to Protect, supra note 51, at 19–20.
92. 521 U.S. at 358–60 (finding that dangerousness coupled with “mental abnormality” permits civil 
committment).
51
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 53 | 2008/09
commitment rather than long prison terms.93  Legal scholars sympathetic to careful 
expansion of preventive detention are well aware of the dangers posed by statutes like 
SVPAs.94  These scholars believe the problems with predicting dangerousness can be 
overcome, and the outcome of preventive detention may be both humane and better 
attuned to public safety considerations.95  However, the reality of preventive deten-
tion in sex offender cases is that it is a miserable failure from both points of view. 
Sex offender civil commitment statutes are only humane in the most Pickwickian 
sense.  In reality, civilly committed sex offenders are treated with contempt befitting 
persons reframed as monsters; and there is little, if any, evidence that society is safer 
because of civil commitment measures.  We perhaps should examine proposals for 
preventive detention in light of this failure.
Law professor Eric Janus has argued that sex offender commitment statutes may 
serve as a template for intrusive government on a massive scale.96  A preventive state 
may be the result of what appears to be the application of preventive detention to a 
limited, and despised, population.  From the point of view of those who believe a 
preventive state is an effective way to protect the public, security seems more impor-
tant than liberty.  Creating classes of outsiders—and framing them as monsters—who 
warrant not simply heightened surveillance, but virtual exclusion from civil society, 
may seem limited today to sex offenders, but on the horizon looms a far more exten-
sive use of these strategies of social control.97
As Janus points out, historically the United States has attempted in the past to 
create preventative legislation, but they were predominantly racially discriminatory. 
The most notorious of such laws, such as the interment of Japanese Americans during 
World War II, have never been overturned by the United States government.98  The 
Supreme Court did hold, in 1962, that a person cannot be punished for having a 
certain status, such as being a drug addict,99 but the sexually violent predator statutes 
open the possibility that mental disorder, even when not strictly speaking mental ill-
ness, will be used in the future to civilly commit people who are diagnosed by 
psychiatrists as antisocial personality disordered, if they also can be demonstrated to 
be dangerous (e.g., by committing a violent crime).  However, as Janus points out, “[t]
he predator template for radical prevention poses a threat to maintaining a sound 
balance between liberty and security.”100  The danger is that the appearance of 
93. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Minding Justice: Laws that Deprive People with Mental 
Disabilities of Life and Liberty (2006) (examining the virtues and difficulties associated with 
expanding preventive detention in the United States).
94. See Slobogin, Proving the Unprovable, supra note 48, at 10–11.
95. See id. at 99–130.
96. Janus, Failure to Protect, supra note 51, at 93–109.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 98.
99. Robinson, 270 U.S. 660.
100. Janus, Failure to Protect, supra note 51, at 102.
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treating rather than punishing can mask severe constraints on liberty.  The public 
may not find that result disturbing, but it would be a radical restructuring of the 
criminal justice system with vast constitutional implications.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have argued that sex offenders in the United States are scapegoats, and for that 
reason are subjected to social violence far in excess of the dangers they pose.  The 
media and the law frame certain sexually deviant behavior as monstrous, and those 
who engage in such behavior as monsters.  Putative experts on deviance—psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists—generally do not refer to sex offenders as monsters, but 
certain categories of mental disorder perform a similar function: they mark off a do-
main of persons who are unable to control their impulses, and therefore ought to be 
treated as outsiders.  The result of such frameworks is the creation of a class of scape-
goats who are not simply unsypathetic, but are regarded as underserving of legal and 
moral rights.  The sex offender may seem to be the prototype of a criminal from 
whom society needs protection, but sex offender laws may also be templates for a far 
more extensive preventive approach to criminal conduct.  
